
| Approaches to Regulation | ![]() | ![]() |
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pages. Chapter: 3: Unit 2: Types and Styles of Regulation ![]() |
3 Incentive Regulation Generally all forms of regulation are based on incentive regulation. Incentive regulation can be defined as the practice of using rewards and penalties to “induce the utility to achieve desired goals where the utility is afforded some discretion in achieving goals” (Lewis and Garmon,1997).The goals may be set by both the regulator and the operator, but the operator enjoys the freedom to decide how it will achieve the stipulated goals. Incentive regulation may also arise because of information asymmetry problems which disenable the regulator from taking the correct decisions. The manner in which Oftel has used the price – cap to effect British Telecom behaviour, by rewarding co-operation and punishing non-cooperation, is a useful illustration of the effectiveness of correctly applied incentive regulation. However incentive regulation (using price caps) has been criticised for overlooking the needs of low income customers. It should be noted that effective incentive regulation is premised on the regulator’s capacity to monitor the operator, to fund the related administrative costs and to gain adequate insight into the operations of the service provider. 4 Yardstick Regulation Compares companies and rewards those with superior performance, penalizes those with inferior performance, or both. The advantages of yardstick regulation, include, providing companies with incentives to improve efficiency and it also dampens the effects of information asymmetries between companies and regulators. However developing appropriate yardsticks is resource intensive and may not be possible in some situations. 5 Performance-Based Regulation (PBR) Another term applied to situations in which performance measures are used to prompt the utility. Good performance measures should be:
6 Franchise Regulation The firm bidding the lowest retail price (subject to meeting quality requirements) becomes the supplier. The strengths of incentive regulation, include, it provides incentives for cost containment through competitive bidding for the right to provide service in a geographic area. However, re-contracting issues arise at the end of the period capital maintenance “lock-in”. Choosing the right combination of tools is critical as there is no single system of regulation that is the best system for all situations. The most common approach requires regulator to use a combination of tools. David Sappington (1994) identified ten guidelines for designing incentive regulation plans:
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